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Abolished in Favor of a Rule of 




For more than a century, antitrust law has operated under two rules of analysis: 
rule of reason and per se. In 1984, however, the Supreme Court fabricated a new 
standard for a particular type of antitrust offense, referred to as the “partial per se” 
rule. This rule confuses and obscures the analysis taking place in tying arrange-
ments and has no place in American jurisprudence. The rule should be abolished, 
and in its place, the Court should adopt the rule of reason analysis and elements 
suggested by Justice O’Connor in the very case from which this “partial” rule 
originated. By doing so, the Supreme Court will better enable lower courts to 
make proper decisions, prevent over-deterrence of tying arrangements, and clarify 
the standards that companies must meet to engage in this business practice. 
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School of Law, 2020. Layout and Design Editor, Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Courts have long employed two different standards for analyzing antitrust 
claims: the rule of reason,1 and the per se analysis.2 For decades, these two rules 
have governed the entire canon of antitrust law.3 The rule of reason is the usual 
standard, and the per se rule applies only to certain business practices.4 Although 
the two rules operate in a similar manner, there is an important distinction be-
tween them. On the one hand, per se analysis applies only to acts that are facially 
anticompetitive, and thus always unreasonable.5 On the other, the rule of reason 
deals with cases where the act in question is not intuitively unreasonable, and thus 
merits a more thorough examination of the act’s circumstances and consequenc-
es.6 
In 1984, the Supreme Court crafted a new rule specifically for analyzing tying 
arrangements, or situations where two products are bundled together for sale as a 
single purchase.7 More specifically, a tying arrangement (also referred to as “bun-
dling”) is any business structure that leverages market power in one product or 
service to bolster sales of another product or service.8 Under this new rule, set 
forth in the seminal case Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde (“Jefferson 
Parish”), tying arrangements may be considered under the per se rule if a party 
can reasonably show that certain threshold conditions were met.9 This hybrid of 
reason and presumptive liability is referred to as the “partial per se” rule.10 
The Supreme Court’s partial per se rule is superfluous and overcomplicated. 
The very year the Jefferson Parish opinion was handed down, the American Bar 
Association observed: “[A]s a practical matter, the need to conduct a number of 
market-related inquiries in order to invoke the per se [sic] rule . . . approaches a 
rule of reason inquiry.”11 As demonstrated herein, the conditions upon which the 
partial per se rule is invoked are identical in substance, procedure, and effect to a 
rule of reason consideration.12 This demonstration will include a review of basic 
antitrust standards,13 an overview of the Jefferson Parish case,14 and the author’s 
arguments for abandoning the partial per se rule.15 Because these standards of 
                                                          
 1. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911). 
 2. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940). 
 3. In re Processed Egg Products Antitrust Litig., 206 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1040 (E.D. Pa., 2016). 
 4. Id. 
 5. All Care Nursing Serv., Inc. v. High Tech Staffing Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 740, 746 (11th Cir., 
1998). 
 6. California Dental Ass’n. v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756, 757 (1999). 
 7. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15–16 (1984). 
 8. Park Irmat Drug Corp. v. Express Scripts Holding Co., 911 F.3d 505, 518 (8th Cir. 2018). 
 9. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 17 (“When the seller’s share of the market is high . . . or when the 
seller offers a unique product that competitors are not able to offer . . . the Court has held that the 
likelihood that market power exists and is being used to restrain competition in a separate market is 
sufficient to make per se condemnation appropriate.”). 
 10. Gary Myers, Tying Arrangements and the Computer Industry: Digidyne Corp. v. Data General 
Corp., 1985 DUKE L.J. 1027, 1029 (1985). 
 11. Id. at 1030 (quoting ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 89–90 (2d ed. 
1984)). 
 12. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 15–16. 
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. See infra Part III. 
 15. See infra Part IV. 
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analysis are so closely matched, the Jefferson Parish v. Hyde partial per se rule 
must be abolished and replaced with a rule of reason analysis. 
II. ANTITRUST OVERVIEW 
Antitrust law has its roots in the late nineteenth-century societal fear of indus-
trial monopolies.16 In the interest of preserving competition in American markets 
and, more directly, to prevent monopolies or combinations that would restrain 
trade or commerce, Congress passed additional relevant laws.17 First was the 
Sherman Act of 1890, which broadly declared general uncompetitive behavior 
unlawful.18 Enacted over two decades later, the Clayton Act of 1914 was aimed 
more at certain economic behaviors that posed a risk of improperly restraining 
trade.19 
A. Per se and Rule of Reason Analysis 
As noted above,20 there are two approaches by which antitrust claims are 
measured: per se and rule of reason.21 To understand the partial per se rule, as 
well as its similarities with these two primary modes of analysis, each standard 
warrants closer examination. 
i. Rule of Reason Analysis 
The rule of reason applies to most antitrust violations and is the standard rule 
for analysis.22 In a broader sense, this rule should feel very familiar, as it simply 
consults the reasonable standard or duty of care that a person or firm owes to an-
other.23 In other words, a court examines the reasonableness of the economic be-
havior to determine if it led to anticompetitive results.24 This comes naturally 
since most violations or offenses in any type of legal action require a reasonable 
examination of the facts in reaching a conclusion.25 
Instead of declaring an act improper as a matter of law, rule of reason analysis 
requires a plaintiff to show not only that a business act or practice occurred, but 
                                                          
 16. 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 1, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 
2019). 
 17. Id.; Id. § 138. 
 18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2019). 
 19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2019); 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2019). 
 20. See supra, Part I. 
 21. Clarkwestern Dietrich Bldg. Sys., L.L.C. v. Certified Steel Stud Ass’n, Inc., 87 N.E.3d 629, 633 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2017). 
 22. Guerrero v. Bensalem Racing Ass’n, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 3d 573, 588 (E.D. Pa. 2014). 
 23. In re Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 315 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See John Gardner, The Many Faces of the Reasonable Person, 131 LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW 1 
(2015), 
https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/The%20Many%20Faces%20of%20the
%20Reasonable%20Person.pdf (extolling the pervasive and useful position of the “reasonable person” 
in common law); see also John Gardner, The Mysterious Case of the Reasonable Person, 51 UNIV. OF 
TORONTO LAW JOURNAL 273 (2001), 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/825941?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents (examining the depth of 
involvement of this “reasonable person” standard in law). 
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that its results were anticompetitive.26 One example of a business practice gov-
erned by the rule of reason analysis is the sharing of business information between 
businesses.27 Upon establishing that the behavior is anticompetitive, a “burden-
shifting framework” follows.28 The burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show 
that pro-competitive effects offset and justify the anticompetitive behavior, after 
which the plaintiff again has the opportunity to show that the defendant’s pro-
competitive ends can be met with more reasonable methods that impose less re-
striction.29 The court uses reason to determine which effects outweigh the other: 
the pro-competitive or anticompetitive.30 The objective of this burden shifting is to 
weigh all the circumstances to determine whether the behavior in question impos-
es an unreasonable restraint on the market or the competition taking place in that 
market.31 Often, this determination centers on a series of elements for the respec-
tive behavior.32 
Because circumstances matter in a rule of reason antitrust action, there is of-
ten a good deal of attention paid to the existence of a firm’s power in the appro-
priate market.33 “Without a definition of that market there is no way to measure 
[the defendant’s] ability to lessen or destroy competition.”34 Specifically, the court 
seeks to evaluate the extent of the offending party’s ability to manipulate prices or 
inhibit competition within that market.35 The root of market power is the ability to 
affect or alter the supply and demand of goods or services in a market.36 
If a court must consult particularities in fact or circumstance, it is likely the 
case will receive a rule of reason analysis.37 Elements or factors of an offense, 
intent, actual results, justifications, and market power examinations are all ways 
that courts consider these cases.38 The truest indicator of rule of reason analysis, 
though, is reason itself—the court must discern whether the business practice was 
reasonable. In its essence, the rule of reason analysis is an examination of facts 
and circumstances—with particular reference to elements of an offense and the 
                                                          
 26. Tanaka v. Univ. of S. California, 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 27. Compare American Column & Lumber Col v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 411–412 (1921), 
with Maple Flooring Mfrs.’ Ass’n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 586 (1925) (holding one infor-
mation-sharing scheme unlawful and another lawful based on the amount and type of information 
shared. In American Column, companies were sharing sales information, customer information, lumber 
types, invoices, terms of sale, price lists, stock and inventory, and other reports. The amount of very 
current information exchanged was held to be a form of fixing prices, and was condemned by the 
court. In Maple Flooring, the information shared was past prices, averages, and total supply details. 
Additionally, this information was shared publicly rather than in secret between firms. This degree of 
information exchange was held lawful and acceptable by the court.). 
 28. Nat’l Hockey League Players’ Ass’n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 325 F.3d 712, 718 (6th 
Cir. 2003). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Tanaka v. Univ. of S. California, 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 31. United States v. Kemp & Assocs., Inc., 907 F.3d 1264, 1272 (10th Cir. 2018). 
 32. Care Heating & Cooling, Inc. v. American Standard, Inc., 427 F.3d 1008, 1014 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(“Rule of reason analysis requires the plaintiff to prove [lists elements of the offense].”). 
 33. In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 315–16 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 34. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965). 
 35. Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 751 F.3d 368, 374 (5th Cir. 2014); 
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 477, 456 (1993). 
 36. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984). 
 37. 58 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM Monopolies § 70, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2019). 
 38. William Holmes and Melissa Mangiaracina, ANTITRUST L. HANDBOOK Sherman Act Section 1 § 
2:10, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2018). 
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market power of a firm—to decide whether a behavior imposes an unreasonable 
restraint on competition.39 
ii. Per se Analysis 
The per se rule allows for what amounts to “an evidentiary shortcut through 
the rule of reason” analysis.40 It operates on the assumption that some behaviors 
are so egregious that they would be unreasonable and anticompetitive under all 
circumstances.41 “It reflects the recognition that some practices will nearly always 
invite condemnation under the rule of reason.”42 The Supreme Court has held that 
per se analysis is for practices that facially appear to always or almost always 
prove anticompetitive.43 A classic example of a per se unlawful offense is price 
fixing.44 
Only certain practices are declared by courts to be per se unlawful.45 A prac-
tice is declared subject to per se analysis if it is “unreasonable on its face” and 
“has ‘no purpose except stifling of competition.’”46 Once an anticompetitive act is 
subjected to this strict analysis, the extreme likelihood of anticompetitive effects 
makes further examination an unjustifiable proposition—the act is a violation of 
antitrust law merely because it occurred.47 
This unforgiving standard of review operates like a strict liability offense; the 
plaintiff wins simply by showing that the act took place.48 Once such an egregious 
business practice is shown, the defendant is not afforded the opportunity to make 
any defense argument.49 Because of the stringent nature of this standard, the court 
is careful in naming the offenses subject to per se analysis.50 “It is only after con-
siderable experience with certain business relationships that courts classify them 
as per se [sic] violations.”51 Note that the experience mentioned by the court is 
experience with a practice, not with an industry; it is the behavior, not the market, 
that constitutes a per se offense.52 
Interestingly, a per se analysis does not require consultation of a firm’s mar-
ket power.53 “Per se liability is reserved only for those agreements that are ‘so 
plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to estab-
lish their illegality.’”54 Once a plaintiff establishes that the defendant took a par-
                                                          
 39. United States v. Kemp & Assocs., Inc., 907 F.3d 1264, 1272 (10th Cir. 2018). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979). 
 44. See United States. v. Joint-Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 505–506 (1898) (holding that railroad 
companies forming a combination to fix rates and fares was clearly anticompetitive and per se unlaw-
ful.). 
 45. United States v. Kemp & Assocs., Inc., 907 F.3d 1264, 1273 (10th Cir. 2018). 
 46. Guerrero v. Bensalem Racing Ass’n, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 3d 573, 587 (E.D. Pa. 2014). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Kemp & Assocs., Inc., 907 F.3d at 1272. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 1273. 
 51. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607–08 (1972). 
 52. Kemp & Assocs., Inc., 907 F.3d at 1273. 
 53. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006). 
 54. Id. (emphasis added). 
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ticular action, “no further market analysis is necessary.”55 Contrast this with the 
rule of reason analysis, where determining market power is an important factor of 
proof.56 
In summation, per se analysis subjects a defendant to liability under a theory 
that a particular practice is universally anticompetitive. Regardless of the argued 
justification or lack of market power, certain acts are never acceptable as a matter 
of antitrust law.57 
B. Tying Arrangements 
Recall that a tying arrangement is a business practice in which a firm leverag-
es market power in one product or service to increase sales of another product or 
service.58 Typically, this happens when a seller with market power with one prod-
uct (known as the “tying product”) bundles sales so that anyone wishing to buy 
the tying product must also buy another secondary product (known as the “tied 
product”).59 The concern in these tying arrangements is that a firm will exploit its 
tying product market power and force consumers to purchase the tied product 
when they would not otherwise do so.60 One early example of a tying arrangement 
is in International Salt Co. v. U.S., where International Salt leased salt-processing 
machines to customers with the mandatory condition that all salt used in the ma-
chines also be purchased from International Salt.61 Under this arrangement, Inter-
national Salt was using its market power in its machines (the tying product in this 
case) to forcibly sell more salt (the tied product).62 
This forced purchase is dangerous because it may foreclose the market of the 
tied product when it would otherwise be competitive.63 The market of the tying 
product is of less concern in tying arrangements; a seller may have an absolute 
monopoly over the tying product (which can be done lawfully through legal 
means, such as a patent), and the court thus focuses on the effects on the tied 
product’s market.64 It is when the bundling of the products inhibits the competi-
tion of the tied product that the bundling becomes a concern.65 
It is worth noting that a tying arrangement does not entail just the single 
structure.66 The two products need not be tied together in the same purchase to 
impose liability on a firm.67 Tying arrangements include business plans wherein 
buyers agree with the seller (through their purchase of the tying product) to not 
buy the tied product from any other suppliers.68 This was the arrangement in In-
                                                          
 55. Kemp & Associates, Inc., 907 F.3d at 1272. 
 56. See supra Subpart II(A)(i). 
 57. Kemp & Associates, Inc., 907 F.3d 1272–73. 
 58. Park Irmat Drug Corp. v. Express Scripts Holding Co., 911 F.3d 505, 518 (8th Cir. 2018). 
 59. Allen-Myland, Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 33 F.3d 194, 200 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (It is interesting to notice that this early tying 
arrangement was held to be unlawful per se. Over the years, the standard has changed and evolved into 
the partial per se rule eventually handed down in Jefferson Parish.). 
 62. Id. 
 63. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 64. Town Sound and Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468, 475 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 65. Id. at 475–76. 
 66. Park Irmat Drug Corp. v. Express Scripts Holding Co., 911 F.3d 505, 518 (8th Cir. 2018). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
6
The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 3 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol3/iss2/10
No. 2] Hodgson: No Such Thing as Partial Per Se 319 
ternational Salt Co. v. U.S., where machine-purchasing customers signified in the 
lease agreement that they would not purchase salt from any company other than 
International Salt.69 
Perhaps one of the most popular examples of a tying arrangement is U.S. v. 
Microsoft Corp., which took place just after the turn of the century.70 In the early 
1990s, Microsoft quickly built an effective monopoly with its Windows Operating 
System (“OS”).71 The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) brought an antitrust suit 
against Microsoft, which ended with a consent decree between the two parties.72 
Less than five years later, the parties were in court again, with the DOJ claiming 
that Microsoft had violated that consent decree.73 
The violating behavior the DOJ relied on was Microsoft’s practice of bun-
dling its OS (the tying product) with its web browser, Internet Explorer (“IE”) (the 
tied product).74 The DOJ had concerns that Microsoft’s monopolistic power in the 
OS market would unfairly promote IE, foreclose the browser market, and build 
another Microsoft monopoly.75 After a preliminary injunction was granted against 
Microsoft, the software company appealed, and the D.C. Circuit held that the ty-
ing arrangement did not violate the consent decree.76 However, the court did not 
make any decision regarding the lawfulness of the tying arrangement itself.77 That 
question was reserved for another action, which began just before the D.C. Circuit 
issued its decision.78 
When a number of state plaintiffs brought suit against Microsoft on the same 
account, the actions were consolidated so the court could finally rule on the tying 
arrangement itself.79 The question finally arose in earnest as to whether Mi-
crosoft’s practice of tying IE to OS was unlawful.80 After the D.C. District Court 
found Microsoft liable, another appeal arose, and the case returned to the D.C. 
Circuit.81 
The plaintiffs, together with the DOJ, alleged that Microsoft had unlawfully 
bundled IE to OS using four different tactics: (1) requiring purchase of both prod-
ucts together at a single price, (2) forbidding equipment manufacturers from unin-
stalling IE, (3) disabling the Add/Remove Programs utility’s ability to let users 
uninstall IE, and (4) designing OS to sometimes override users’ preference and 
make IE the default web browser.82 
The D.C. Circuit affirmed, reversed, and remanded various aspects of the 
case.83 The tying arrangement claim was vacated and remanded for the district 
                                                          
 69. Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). 
 70. United States. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 71. Id. at 50–51. 
 72. Id. at 47; see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 73. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 47; United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 
1998). 
 74. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 47. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id.; see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 78. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 84 (discussing a number of other claims regarding monopolization and attempted monopo-
lization were also before the court.). 
 81. Id. at 48. 
 82. Id. at 84–85. 
 83. Id. at 118–19. 
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court to reconsider,84 but the parties reached a settlement before the lower court 
took any action.85 Despite the lack of a final rule from the court, the case remains 
illustrative for what tying arrangements are and how they may be structured.86 
III. JEFFERSON PARISH V. HYDE AND THE PARTIAL PER SE RULE 
With an understanding now of tying arrangements and the models of analysis 
used in antitrust law (per se and rule of reason), the groundwork necessary to 
investigate the seminal tying case, Jefferson Parish v. Hyde, is laid.87 As previous-
ly alluded,88 the Court in Jefferson Parish created and adopted the convoluted 
“partial per se” rule, ignoring the more prudent rule of reason elements suggested 
by Justice O’Connor in her concurrence.89 
A. Case Overview 
The incidents leading to the case began in 1977, when Edwin G. Hyde ap-
plied to become an anesthesiologist at East Jefferson Hospital (“EJH”).90 His ap-
plication was reviewed by the hospital’s credentials committee and medical staff 
executive committees, and both recommended employment.91 However, the hospi-
tal board denied Hyde’s application.92 EJH was contractually bound to employ 
anesthesiologists exclusively from the professional medical corporation Roux & 
Associates (“Roux”).93 Because Hyde was not a member of Roux, EJH was con-
tractually obligated to deny him employment.94 
When Hyde heard about this contract between EJH and Roux, he brought suit 
seeking both employment at EJH and a court declaration that the contract was 
unlawful.95 The District Court found that the anticompetitive consequences were 
minimal and held in favor of EJH.96 The Court of Appeals reversed after identify-
ing the tying arrangement EJH had hidden in its business structure.97 
According to the Fifth Circuit, patients at EJH were forced to purchase anes-
thesia services from the same provider as their surgical services.98 The tying prod-
                                                          
 84. Id. at 84. 
 85. See Amanda Cohen, Surveying the Microsoft Antitrust Universe, 19 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 333, 
335 (2004); see also United States v. Microsoft, 231 F. Supp. 2d 144 (2002) (approving the parties’ 
consent decree drafted during settlement). 
 86. See, e.g., In re: Cox Enters., Inc., 871 F.3d 1093 (10th Cir. 2017); ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton 
Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 263 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 87. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 4–5 (1984). 
 88. See supra Part I. 
 89. Id.; see Jefferson Par., 466 U.S. at 32 (1984) (O’Connor, J., Concurring); see also Myers, supra 
note 10, at 1029 (calling this rule by the name used herein: “partial per se.”). 
 90. Jefferson Par., 466 U.S. at 5. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 5-6 (“The contract provided that any anesthesiologist designated by Roux would be admit-
ted to the hospital’s medical staff. . . . The hospital agreed to ‘restrict the use of its anesthesia depart-
ment to Roux . . . and no other persons, parties, or entities shall perform such services. . . .’”). 
 94. Id. at 6. 
 95. Id. at 5. 
 96. Id. at 2. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 8. 
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uct was held to be the operating rooms, and the tied product was the anesthesiolo-
gy.99 The court then declared that EJH had sufficient market power in the tying 
product market (surgical services) to make purchase of its tied product (anesthesi-
ology) coercive in nature.100 Because patients were coerced into purchasing EJH’s 
chosen anesthesia services, the Fifth Circuit held the tying arrangement illegal per 
se.101 
EJH appealed from the Fifth Circuit ruling, and the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to further examine the standard for tying products.102 In a unanimous 
decision, the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s holding and concluded that the 
tying arrangement was lawful.103 Despite the uniformity of opinion, however, 
there was some disagreement as to what standard applied to tying arrangements.104 
Two concurring opinions came from the decision,105 but the majority of the court 
applied what has now become known as the partial per se rule.106 In 2006, part of 
the Jefferson Parish opinion was abrogated by another case, but that abrogation 
did not concern the partial per se rule and will play no part in this analysis.”107 
B. The Partial Per se Rule 
At face value, the partial per se rule created in Jefferson Parish is contradic-
tory at best. The majority declared with unquestionable certainty that “[i]t is far 
too late in the history of our antitrust jurisprudence” to think that some tying ar-
rangements are not unreasonable per se.108 In the very next paragraph, however, 
the Court seemingly backtracks on its strong assumption by claiming that, clearly, 
not all tying arrangements are anticompetitive.109 In fact, these bundled sales are 
sometimes attractive to buyers, who enjoy the convenience of being able to ac-
quire two items for the effort of one.110 The care taken to exclude “certain tying 
arrangements” evinces the presence of inconsistency in this rule.111 
To illustrate its point regarding the convenience of tying arrangements, the 
Court used the example of a supplier of baking materials.112 There is no harm in a 
seller offering to sell flour and sugar either together or not at all; in fact, many 
                                                          
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 4–5. 
 103. Id. at 2. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 32–47 (Brennan, J., concurring) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 106. See Myers, supra note 10, at 1029. 
 107. See Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006) (abrogating a presumption 
reiterated in Jefferson Parish, but stated in earlier cases). The Jefferson Parish court reiterated that 
when the government grants a patent, it presumptively conveys market power to the patent-holder. 
Jefferson Par., 466 U.S. at 16. This rule existed in some form since the 1940s. See Morton Salt Co. v. 
G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491 (1942). Before Jefferson Parish, the rule was stated most clearly 
in U.S. v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, n. 4 (1962) (“. . . when the tying product is patented . . . sufficien-
cy of economic power is presumed.”). The Court in Illinois Tool Works only abrogated this presump-
tion, thus leaving the partial per se rule intact. Ill. Tool Works, Inc. 547 U.S. at 31. 
 108. Jefferson Par., 466 U.S. at 9. 
 109. Id. at 11 (“It is clear, however, that every refusal to sell two products separately cannot be said to 
restrain competition.”). 
 110. Id. at 12. 
 111. Id. at 9. 
 112. Id. at 12. 
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aspiring bakers will admire the efficiency of this opportunity.113 Some circum-
stances—particularly in a competitive market, as the Court points out—allow for 
tying as a method of increasing competition.114 The problem comes when the sell-
er of the tied products has enough market power that it can “force” its consumers 
into purchasing both when they would ordinarily purchase just one.115 
To determine whether there was a market power component forcing purchas-
ers into their decisions, the majority examined a number of elements which, if all 
present, would subject EJH to per se liability.116 These elements were more suc-
cinctly enumerated in U.S. v. Microsoft Corp.: 
There are four elements to a per se tying violation: (1) the tying and tied 
goods are two separate products; (2) the defendant has market power in 
the tying product market; (3) the defendant affords consumers no choice 
but to purchase the tied product from it; and (4) the tying arrangement 
forecloses a substantial volume of commerce.117 
By analyzing these four elements, the majority in Jefferson Parish concluded 
that EJH’s practice was not per se unlawful.118 First, the Court found that surgery 
and anesthesiology were two separate products;119 the two are billed separately, 
and patients often made requests for specific anesthesiologists to supervise their 
operations.120 The Court is careful to note, however, that simply meeting this first 
element does not inherently render the arrangement unlawful.121 Second, the Court 
examined the strength of EJH’s market power and concluded that its 30% share of 
the local market was insufficient to raise concerns.122 Third, the Court compared 
the two products at issue (surgery and anesthesiology) and concluded that there 
was little evidence of forcing.123 Fourth, the Court concluded that, in light of the 
other elements, there was no evidence that this tying arrangement foreclosed con-
sumer choice.124 
Because the Court found that only one of the four elements had been met, the 
majority held that the tying arrangement was not per se unlawful.125 This nearly 
three-decade-old standard is still used to consider tying arrangements.126 One re-
                                                          
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 11–12. 
 115. Id. at 13–14 (“[W]e have condemned tying arrangements when the seller has some special abil-
ity—usually called “market power”—to force a purchaser to do something that he would not do in a 
competitive market.”). 
 116. See generally id. (examining different elements to determine per se liability). 
 117. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 118. Jefferson Par., 466 U.S. at 31. 
 119. Id. at 24–25. 
 120. Id. at 22. 
 121. Id. at 24–25. 
 122. Id. at 26–27. 
 123. Id. at 28 (The Court’s reasoning here is slightly more muddled, but essentially the analysis 
concludes that most people do not demand separate consideration of each product on its merits, and 
therefore this tying arrangement did not foreclose a decision that many people made.). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 28–29. 
 126. See Cascade Health Sols. v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 913 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The Supreme 
Court has developed a unique per se rule for illegal tying arrangements. For a tying claim to suffer per 
se condemnation, a plaintiff must prove . . .”); Rick-Mik Enters., Inc. v. Equilon Enters. LLC, 532 F.3d 
963, 971 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Not all tying arrangements are illegal.”). 
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cent case draws attention to the discrepancy between the standard rule and the rule 
applied in Jefferson Parish: 
[T]oday’s per se rule against tying is dramatically more nuanced than the 
typical per se rule. . . . Though the typical antitrust per se rule requires no 
analysis of market conditions or effects, the Supreme Court has declared 
that the per se rule for tying arrangements demands a showing that the tie 
creates “a substantial potential for impact on competition.”127 
Despite the abnormality of the rule, courts continue to follow this “nuanced” 
and rigorous partial per se analysis.128 
C. The Concurrence 
Three other justices on the Court joined Justice O’Connor’s “rule of reason” 
concurrence in Jefferson Parish.129 Though the decision was unanimous, the Court 
was split 5-4 as to which rule to adopt.130 Justice O’Connor’s analysis fell short by 
only one vote, but would otherwise have been the majority opinion.131 The rule for 
analyzing tying arrangements would be far simpler and more effective had she 
managed to sway one more justice to her side.132 
In short, O’Connor believed the court was right in not finding EJH’s ar-
rangement unlawful, but thought the time had come to scrap per se analysis in 
favor of a newer, simpler rule of reason standard.133 She proposed three elements 
for consideration in a rule of reason analysis: (1) the market power of the seller in 
the tying market, (2) the threat of market power in the tied market, and (3) a basis 
for selling the two items separately.134 
First, O’Connor would have the Court examine the seller’s market power in 
the market of the tying product.135 To illustrate why this is important, she returns 
to the analogy of the seller of baking supplies.136 If the seller has market power 
over flour, then a tying arrangement with sugar is concerning; anyone who wants 
                                                          
 127. In re: Cox Enters., Inc., 871 F.3d 1093, 1097 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Jefferson Par., 466 U.S. at 32 (1984) (O’Connor, J., joined by Burger, Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., 
concurring). 
 130. Id. at 33. 
 131. Id. at 32. 
 132. See generally, Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented Court 
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the 
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those members who concurred in the 
judgments on the narrowest grounds.’”). In Jefferson Parish, the Court, as noted, was unanimous, with 
five Justices joining in the opinion. Convincing one more Justice would have given Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion its fifth vote and made it the holding. Alternatively, had there been a plurality, the Court would 
have been forced to decide which opinion is narrower. Instinctually, the majority opinion seems nar-
rower, but even then, Justice O’Connor’s view should have prevailed. See Jefferson Par., 466 U.S. 2. 
The two opinions are identical in application (see infra, Subpart IV(A)), and the majority’s holding 
opens up a new standard (partial per se) while O’Connor’s operates within the existing framework of 
the law. 
 133. Jefferson Par., 466 U.S. at 33. 
 134. Id. at 41 (summarizing the elements laid out in greater detail in the preceding paragraphs of the 
concurrence). 
 135. Id. at 37–38. 
 136. Id. 
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flour must also purchase sugar.137 However, if the seller has no market power over 
flour, then there is no harm in bundling its goods with sugar.138 Customers can 
seek out other sellers if they find the arrangement inconvenient.139 
The second element O’Connor suggested is an analysis of the threat the seller 
poses in the market of the tied product.140 If the seller is leveraging their market 
power in the tying product market in order to establish a monopoly in the tied 
product market, the arrangement is concerning.141 In other words, a seller cannot 
use a first monopoly in order to get a second.142 If, however, there is little risk of 
this secondary monopoly, or if entry barriers to that second market are low and 
new sellers may take up business, then competition will still be preserved.143 
The final element argued for by Justice O’Connor is that there must be a “co-
herent economic basis” for treating the two products as distinct or separate.144 As 
O’Connor pointed out, all but the basest and simplest of sales are of products that 
in some way consist of smaller products.145 However, we do not think of these 
products as separate.146 O’Connor used cars and engines, or cameras and lenses, as 
examples.147 Neither example has aged well, and both prove problematic, as both 
engine and lens markets now exist independent of cars or cameras.148 For simpler 
reference, consider a watch sold separately from its gears, or a smartphone and 
screen sold separately. While neither is wholly unheard of, the considerable 
weight of consumer practice is to purchase both as a single entity. With this ele-
ment, O’Connor suggested that in order for the tying arrangement to be dangerous 
to competition, the two products must be ordinarily distinct.149 
Even when all three of these elements are met, Justice O’Connor suggested 
that some tying arrangements will still be lawful.150 This belief stands in marked 
contrast to the majority opinion.151 While the Jefferson Parish majority holds 
tying arrangements per se unlawful if the four elements are met,152 O’Connor 
persisted in her belief that even then, some arrangements are appropriately com-
petitive.153 Her concurrence argued that, in the end, the decision should come 
down to the observable economic effects of the tying arrangement.154 O’Connor 
                                                          
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 38. 
 140. Id. at 38–39. 
 141. Id. at 39. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 38. 
 144. Id. at 39. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 40. 
 147. Id. at 39. 
 148. See Global Automobile Engine & Parts Manufacturing Industry: Industry Market Research 
Report, IBISWORLD, https://www.ibisworld.com/industry-trends/global-industry-
reports/manufacturing/automobile-engine-parts-manufacturing.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2019) (giving 
a report on the industry for automobile engines); see also Jim Fisher, The Best DSLR and Mirrorless 
Camera Lenses of 2018, PC (July 17, 2018), https://www.pcmag.com/article/362341/the-best-dslr-and-
mirrorless-camera-lenses (offering an example of the thriving market for camera lenses). 
 149. Jefferson Par., 466 U.S. at 39–40 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 150. Id. at 41. 
 151. Id. at 16 (majority opinion). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 41 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 154. Id. 
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even cited another Supreme Court case where a number of tying arrangements are 
lauded for economic and pro-competitive benefits they introduce to the market.155 
Clearly, she viewed the standard for tying arrangements very differently than did 
the majority. 
IV. ARGUMENTS FOR ADOPTION OF THE RULE OF REASON 
In 1984, the opinion that implemented the partial per se rule represented a 
very narrow majority.156 The rule was improper then, and now that the law and the 
economy have both further developed over 35 years,157 it is even more improper. 
In the interest of reasonable, consistent, and applicable law, and the interest of 
market competition, the partial per se rule must be abolished, and a rule of reason 
analysis adopted. 
A. The Two Systems of Analysis are Identical in Practice 
The suggested elements for a rule of reason analysis in Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence are effectively the same as the majority’s requirements for per se 
liability to apply.158 By way of quick review, the elements of each are as follows. 
For the majority’s partial per se rule, there must be (1) two separate products, (2) 
market power in the tying market, (3) forced purchase of the tied item, and (4) 
foreclosure of a substantial volume of commerce.159 For the concurrence’s rule of 
reason, there must be (1) market power in the tying market, (2) threat of market 
power in the tied market, and (3) an economic basis for selling the two items sepa-
rately.160 
To begin, note the obvious similarities between the two rules. Elements of 
both the partial per se and the rule of reason analyses seek evidence that the seller 
has market power in the market of the tying product.161 Two other elements also 
share an uncanny similarity. The majority’s first requirement is that the two prod-
ucts be separate from each other.162 Meanwhile, the concurrence looks for a “co-
herent economic basis” for treating the two products as distinct.163 While not iden-
tical like the first set of elements, these two pursue the same ends. The Jefferson 
Parish majority opinion described the essential characteristic of unlawful ar-
rangements as any that uses market power over the tying product to force the pur-
chase of a tied product.164 This arrangement is particularly evident when the tied 
product is something that the buyer either “did not want at all, or might have pre-
                                                          
 155. Id. (citing Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 514 at n. 9 (1969)). 
 156. See id. at 32. 
 157. See Matthew Speiser, This Video Shows how the World Economy has Evolved over the Last 35 
Years, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 4, 2015), https://www.businessinsider.com/how-world-economy-
evolved-over-35-years-2015-10. 
 158. Compare Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) with Jefferson Par. Hosp. 
Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 32, 35 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 159. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (summarizing the dispar-
ately enumerated elements of Jefferson Parish). 
 160. Jefferson Par., 466 U.S. at 41 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 161. Id. at 18 (majority opinion); Id. at 37–38 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 162. Id. at 16 (majority opinion). 
 163. Id. at 39 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 164. Id. at 12 (majority opinion). 
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ferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms.”165 Justice O’Connor’s concur-
rence expresses this same concern for the consumer’s desire to purchase its items 
separately: “[f]or products to be treated as distinct, the tied product must, at a 
minimum, be one that some consumers might wish to purchase separately without 
also purchasing the tying product.”166 For both opinions, the concern is the same: 
when a tying arrangement forces the combined sale of separate items, it restrains 
consumer choice and competition. 
The final element suggested by Justice O’Connor is the threat of market pow-
er in the market of the tied product.167 However, two elements remain from the 
majority’s partial per se rule: forced purchase of the tied item and foreclosure of a 
substantial volume of commerce.168 These final two elements can be combined to 
amount to the same concern of a threatened monopoly in the second market. 
As the majority describes, forcing a purchase is the essential characteristic of 
an unlawful tying arrangement.169 “When such ‘forcing’ is present, competition on 
the merits in the market for the tied item is restrained.”170 The concurrence fol-
lows this line of concern when speaking of the threatened second monopoly: “[n]o 
such threat exists if the tied-product market is occupied by many stable sellers 
who are not likely to be driven out.”171 In other words, if there are no forced re-
straints on the market, there is no threat of market power in the tied-product mar-
ket.172 
When the majority speaks on the subject of market foreclosure, the similari-
ties are even more marked.173 “[W]e have refused to condemn tying arrangements 
unless a substantial volume of commerce is foreclosed,” the majority asserts.174 
This “foreclosure’ represents a concern that a portion of the market will be re-
strained by the power of the seller.175 In a footnote, the majority opinion made this 
comparison more directly: “[t]he tying seller may be working toward a monopoly 
position in the tied product and, even if he is not, the practice of tying forecloses 
other sellers of the tied product and makes it more difficult for new firms to enter 
that market.”176 By comparing the opinions’ own comments, we see that, though 
they use different language, they were discussing the same concerns. One triggers 
per se unlawfulness, while the other simply serves to assist a judge applying the 
rule of reason, but the considerations and interests served by each rule are essen-
tially the same. 
                                                          
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 39 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). 
 167. Id. at 38–39. 
 168. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 169. Jefferson Par., 466 U.S. at 12 (majority opinion). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 38 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 16 (majority opinion). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at n.19 (citing Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp, 394 U.S. 495, 513 (1969)). 
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B. The Purpose of Per se Analysis is Foiled by a Partial Rule 
One of the reasons that per se analysis exists is so that firms are discouraged 
from engaging in certain practices.177 Because of this harsh deterrent effect, courts 
only invoke the per se rule of analysis when a business behavior is clearly anti-
competitive.178 Courts have gone so far as to say that per se analysis applies to 
acts that have no other feasible purpose besides harming competition.179 Because 
of this high standard, per se is typically reserved for acts that have such a high 
likelihood of anticompetitive effects that further examination (through the rule of 
reason) is unjustified.180 Tying arrangements do not fit within this mold.181 The 
Jefferson Parish majority was scrupulous in its attempt to clarify this point.182 
Tying arrangements were only “per se” unlawful when the listed elements were 
met.183 Justice O’Connor, on the other hand, was more explicit in her recognition 
of this inconsistency with per se offenses.184 “Tie-ins may entail economic bene-
fits,” she recognized, just before listing boons the practice may bestow.185 Clearly, 
tying arrangements do not serve this first purpose of per se rules. 
Per se analysis can also serve as an evidentiary shortcut through the “morass” 
that is the rule of reason.186 Courts have suggested that the per se rule is not dif-
ferent from the rule of reason; it is merely a simplified analysis.187 If the offense is 
unlawful often enough, a court will apply per se analysis to save time and avoid 
the expense of a more thorough examination.188 That purpose is not served if a 
court must first meet a threshold of four elements every time it seeks to apply the 
per se rule. The length of the Jefferson Parish opinion clearly demonstrates the 
inefficiency of this “shortcut.”189 The majority is performing the very same analy-
sis the per se rule seeks to avoid. It is a logical fallacy to require courts to apply a 
rule of strict liability that is not actually strict so as to avoid an analysis that it 
must actually still perform. 
C. Possible Undesirable Outcomes of the Partial Per se Rule 
The unintended consequences of this partial per se rule are both economic 
and legal in nature. Detrimental economic effects mainly concern the deterrent 
effect of the per se rule.190 The Supreme Court expressed this concern over two 
decades ago for another offense: “per se . . . would discourage firms from chang-
                                                          
 177. See NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 129 (1998). 
 178. Guerrero v. Bensalem Racing Ass’n, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 3d 573, 587 (E.D. Pa. 2014). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 103–04 (1984). 
 181. Jefferson Par., 466 U.S. at 11–12 (1984) (“It is clear, however, that every refusal to sell two 
products separately cannot be said to restrain competition.”). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 15–16; see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 184. Jefferson Par., 466 U.S. at 41 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 185. Id. 
 186. United States v. Kemp & Assoc., Inc., 907 F.3d 1264, 1272 (10th Cir. 2018). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 1272–73. 
 189. Id.; see Jefferson Par., 466 U.S. 2 (majority opinion). 
 190. NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 129 (1998). 
15
Hodgson: No Such Thing as Partial Per se: Why Jefferson Parish v. Hyde Sho
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019
328 B.E.T.R. [Vol. 3 2019 
ing suppliers—even where the competitive process itself does not suffer harm.”191 
Fear that a per se rule may deter more anticompetitive practices than intended is 
ever-present.192 
Tying arrangements, which are deterred by a per se rule, have many positive 
effects. Generally, bundling lets buyers get more product for less cost, which 
proves a great benefit to the consumer.193 Some analysts have also contended that 
tying arrangements stimulate demand, reduce unsustainable pricing models, pro-
mote efficiency, and lower transaction costs.194 “In short, there are many pro-
competitive, or at worst competitively neutral, reasons for bundling.”195 It is un-
wise to deter such a positive business practice with a per se invocation. 
The rule should also be simplified to prevent confusion in the courts. Some 
federal districts already seem to think that tying arrangements are examined under 
the rule of reason.196 Just last August, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania imple-
mented the rule of reason, rather than the partial per se rule.197 The complexity of 
the partial per se rule looks enough like the rule of reason that these courts are 
already slipping into the “wrong” rule (though the “wrong” rule is the better anal-
ysis).198 
V. CONCLUSION 
As discussed herein, the Jefferson Parish partial per se standard must be 
overturned. The partial per se rule in the majority and the rule of reason analysis 
suggested in the concurrence are identical in practice,199 and the purposes of the 
per se rule are foiled by this hybrid agglomeration.200 Further, there are legal and 
economic ramifications that confuse the law and deter pro-competitive behav-
ior.201 There is a common idiom: “if it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and 
quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck.”202 The Jefferson Parish majority 
opinion implements a partial per se rule that looks, acts, and reasons much like the 
rule of reason test. It is so much like the rule of reason and so poorly serves the 
purposes of per se rules, that it has no place in antitrust jurisprudence. To simplify 
and clarify, the partial per se rule of Jefferson Parish must be abolished, and tying 
arrangements should instead be analyzed under the rule of reason. 
                                                          
 191. Id. at 136–37. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Cascade Health Sols. v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 895 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 194. Thomas A. Lambert, Evaluating Bundled Discounts, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1688, 1723–24 (2005). 
 195. Id. at 1724. 
 196. Pfizer Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 333 F. Supp. 3d 494, 503 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (“bundled rebate 
claims are analyzed under a rule of reason framework.”). 
 197. Id. 
 198. See id. 
 199. See supra, Subpart IV. 
 200. See supra, Subpart IV(B). 
 201. See supra, Subpart IV(C). 
 202. Duck Test, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duck_test (the origin is debated, so to 
avoid presumption, a common, colloquial source is here cited). 
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